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SUMMARY 
Background: Pseudomonas aeruginosa is a ubiquitous and important opportunistic 
pathogen in immunocompromised or critically ill patients. Nosocomial P. 
aeruginosa outbreaks have been associated with hospital water sources. Here we 
describe engineering interventions to minimise contamination of water outlets and 
the subsequent clinical impact. 
Methods: New tap outlets were fitted at selected outlets across the intensive care 
unit (ICU). Laboratory testing demonstrated that, following artificial contamination 
with P. aeruginosa, these taps could be effectively decontaminated using a thermal 
washer disinfector. Water samples were collected weekly from new outlets on the 
ICU over an 8-month period and tested for the enumeration of P. aeruginosa via 
membrane filtration. surveillance of P. aeruginosa from clinical specimens was 
routinely undertaken. 
Results: Prior to the interventions, water sampling on ICU indicated that 30% of the 
outlets were positive for P. aeruginosa at any one time and Whole Genome 
Sequencing data suggested at least 30% transmission from water to patient. Since 
their installation, weekly sampling of the new tap outlets has been negative for P. 
aeruginosa, and the number of P. aeruginosa clinical isolates has fallen by 50%. 
Conclusions: Installation and maintenance of tap outlets free of P. aeruginosa can 
substantially reduce the number of P. aeruginosa clinical isolates in an ICU.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa is a ubiquitous and important opportunistic pathogen in 
immunocompromised or critically ill patients.1-3 In the UK, P. aeruginosa is 
responsible for 3% of all reported monospecies bacteraemias.4 Due to its natural 
ability to survive in the moist environment, nosocomial P. aeruginosa outbreaks have 
been associated with hospital water sources.5-6 In 2013 the Department of Health 
(DH) in England published guidance that included recommendations for sampling of 
water and implementing control measures where P. aeruginosa is found in the 
water.7 
Water outlets, particularly taps and associated pipework, are a recognised reservoir 
for micro-organisms, providing a large surface area for biofilms to harbour potential 
pathogens, such as P. aeruginosa.6,8 Between November 2011 and January 2012, 
25 babies admitted to neonatal intensive care units in Northern Ireland acquired P. 
aeruginosa;6,9 these incidents were attributed to contaminated tap outlets. Further 
nosocomial P. aeruginosa outbreaks associated with hospital water sources have 
been reported.10-12 Other potential routes of transmission include cross-infection, for 
example, carriage on the hands of healthcare workers, and through contaminated 
medical equipment.13-14 The DH has recently updated the Health Technical 
Memorandum (HTM) 04-01 which emphasises the role of water in nosocomial 
infections and suggests a risk-management approach to the safety of water is pivotal 
in the control of infection in a healthcare setting.15-16  
We have previously shown that holistic measures, including appropriate tap cleaning 
and waste water disposal, combined with installation of point of use filters have 
resulted in reduction of waterborne transmission of P. aeruginosa in a tertiary referral 
hospital intensive care unit (ICU).17 Here we describe the use of an engineering 
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intervention to control P. aeruginosa on our ICU. We specifically investigated 
whether installation of new tap outlets would have an impact on the number of 
outlets colonised with P. aeruginosa and whether this would have a clinical impact. 
Secondary aims of the study were to investigate whether P. aeruginosa could be 
removed from contaminated taps, and to determine how often water sampling 
needed to be undertaken in a setting where contamination of tap outlets with P. 
aeruginosa is high. 
  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 5
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
Setting. Queen Elizabeth Hospital Birmingham (QEHB) is a tertiary referral National 
Health Service teaching hospital in Birmingham, UK. QEHB has one of the largest 
co-located ICUs in the world with 100 beds and 231 water outlets, of which 130 are 
clinical outlets. The hospital is funded via a Private Finance Initiative (PFI), and was 
opened in 2010. 
Patient surveillance. Surveillance of P. aeruginosa in clinical specimens was 
undertaken as previously described.17  
Water sampling and microbiological methods. Water samples from all outlets on the 
ICU were collected every 6 months. These were cultured and P. aeruginosa 
identified as previously described.17 Additional water sampling was performed from 
the eight test outlets (see below), and from eight randomly selected control outlets, 
also on ICU A. All of the test and control outlets were clinical hand wash basins. 
Engineering interventions. On ICU A 8 new taps (Marwik 21, Armitage Shanks, UK; 
Figure 1) were fitted at selected bed spaces (Figure 2). These replaced the previous 
Rada therm 3 (Rada, UK) tap outlets that were installed across QEHB at the time of 
construction. The new taps were selected on the basis of recommendations from 
colleagues in other centres that they may be associated with fewer contamination 
issues with P. aeruginosa. ICU The 8-bedded bay on ICU A was chosen because it 
had a dedicated sluice to facilitate disposal of patient waste water. 
Test taps. The Markwik21 tap assembly (Figure 1) is designed to be detached from 
the water supply, dismantled and subjected to a decontamination procedure.  The 
spout and mixing valve can be removed and access to the pipework achieved by 
removal of a cover from each end.  The components can withstand high 
temperatures and can be processed in a benchtop thermal washer disinfector. 
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Removal of artificial contamination. The initial assessment of the ease of 
decontamination of the test taps was undertaken with artificial contamination. Two 
strains of P. aeruginosa were used: NCTC 6749 and PS-1054, a clinical isolate from 
QEHB known to readily form biofilm.18 A suspension of the test bacteria containing 
approximately 108/ml was prepared in sterile distilled water.  The spout, thermostatic 
mixing valve (TMV) and pipework (Bar) were flushed / immersed in the culture for 30 
seconds. Excess culture was discarded, the components were placed into a sealed 
plastic bag to retain humidity and were stored at 21°C for 7 days to allow biofilm 
formation. Microbial counts on the components were determined before and after 
disinfection using a Medisafe Pico thermal washer-disinfector with 3E-Zyme 
enzymatic cleaner (Medisafe, Stortford, UK).  The spout and mixing valve were 
sampled by placing them in a sterile bag containing ¼ strength Ringer’s solution 
(Oxoid, Basingstoke, UK) and processing in an ultrasonic water bath for 1 minute. 
The wash fluid was then cultured to determine the number of viable bacteria.  The 
pre-disinfection samples were serially diluted in Ringer’s solution, whilst the post 
disinfection samples were filtered, and the filter placed on the surface of a culture 
plate.  The pipework was too large to sample in this way, so a manual 
washing/flushing method was used. This entailed aseptically transferring the bar to a 
sterile plastic bag, followed by manual elution with 100 ml Ringer’s solution. The pre 
and post samples were plated onto tryptone soya agar plates and incubated for 42 - 
48 hours at 37oC, and the numbers of colony forming units were enumerated. Tests 
were performed in triplicate.  
The sampling methods were validated by performing a pre-count sampling 
procedure on a contaminated tap, followed by a further sampling procedure on the 
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same (still contaminated) tap. This allowed the reduction in bioburden due to the 
sampling procedure to be measured. 
Removal of natural contamination. At the conclusion of the 33-week sampling period, 
two test taps (from ICU A) were removed and disassembled into their component 
parts. The spout, TMV and bar were sampled for pre-counts, processed in a washer-
disinfector, and then sampled for post counts in the same manner as for the artificial 
contamination detailed above. 
Holistic interventions. In February 2016 (Figure 2), a revised tap cleaning method 
was implemented, as previously described.19 Patient waste water was disposed of 
directly into the sluice, or into a macerator after addition of absorbent gel sheets 
(Figure 2).17  
Statistics. TVCs and P. aeruginosa CFUs between the test and control taps were 
compared using negative binomial regression models in the MASS package in R 
version 3.5.0.20 To determine the frequency of water sampling, Bayesian analysis 
was used to determine the probability, θ, of a tap being contaminated with P. 
aeruginosa. The Bayesian analysis was performed by hand and subsequently 
ratified in R.20 Patient acquisition rates of P. aeruginosa per 100,000 bed days in ICU 
overall, and in ICU A separately, were analysed using segmented Poisson 
regression models in R, using a similar technique to Gebski et al.,20-21 Data from the 
period August 2013 to December 2017 were included in the analysis.  
Audits. Monthly audits were undertaken by the Infection Prevention and Control 
Team during the period of this report. These included monitoring the correct disposal 
of patient waste water and tap cleaning. 
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RESULTS 
Water sampling. From the water sampling undertaken on the ICU, 27% of the outlets 
were positive for P. aeruginosa in 2017 (Table 1). Since 2013, there has been a 37% 
increase in the number of water outlets colonized with P. aeruginosa across the ICU 
(Table 1). 
Test Tap decontamination. Validation of the sampling method showed that the mean 
reduction in contamination over the serial sampling procedures, calculated using the 
three components of two taps was found to be 1.11 log10 units (data not shown). 
Sampling an artificially contaminated tap showed mean log10 reduction factors after 
thermal disinfection for the different components of 6.36 for the bar, 6.98 for the TMV 
and 6.20 for the spout. 
Total viable counts of test tap samples. Approximately one week after the installation 
of the test taps, weekly sampling commenced. The mean TVC isolated from the 264 
control samples was 15402 CFUs, whilst the mean from the same number of test 
samples was 10360 CFUs. Using a negative binomial regression model the TVCs of 
test taps were significantly lower than for control taps (p = 0.000232).  
P. aeruginosa isolated from tap samples. Substantial levels of P. aeruginosa were 
recovered from the control taps. However, there were only two instances of 
contamination of test taps with P. aeruginosa; 2 CFUs were recovered from one test 
tap, and 1 CFU from another, as isolated occurrences (subsequent samples from 
both taps were negative). The mean P. aeruginosa CFU’s isolated from the two 
sample types were highly divergent (3313.6 and 0.011 for control and test samples, 
respectively), and a negative binomial regression model confirmed that P. 
aeruginosa counts from the test taps were significantly lower (p < 2 x 10-16).  
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Tap decontamination redux. After 8 months two test taps were removed and 
sampled. While there was no contamination recovered from the spout of one of the 
taps, the other components contained extensive levels of bacteria. The log10 pre-
counts per 100ml were 5.04 for the other spout, 4.56 and 5.34 for the bars, and 6.68 
and 6.78 for the TMV’s. The components were then processed through the washer-
disinfector and then resampled. All of the post-counts were zero.  
Water testing frequency. Bayesian analysis (beta-binomial conjugate model) was 
used to predict the probability of detecting contamination with P. aeruginosa from 
each control or test tap from water sampling (Table 2). The model suggests monthly 
sampling detects all the P. aeruginosa positive outlets more assuredly than six-
month sampling regimes over any one six month period. 
Clinical isolates. The Poisson regression model used to analyse the clinical isolates 
from ICU as a whole suggests that the two most important interventions were the 
fitting of filters to selected taps across ICU, and the alteration of the disposal of 
waste water and cleaning protocols (‘holistic factors’) (Figure 3A). The model 
provides very strong evidence that the provision of filters was coincident with a 
marked reduction in the acquisition of P. aeruginosa (p = 3.73 x 10-8). The trend term 
in the model suggests that over the 12-month period following the introduction of 
filters, there was a 67% decrease in the acquisition of P. aeruginosa across ICU. 
Somewhat counterintuitively, the model provides good evidence that the introduction 
of ‘holistic factors’ across the whole of ICU was associated with an increase in the 
acquisition of P. aeruginosa (p = 0.00135). In contrast, the regression model used to 
analyse ICU A alone, suggests that the only important intervention was the fitting of 
the new taps (Figure 3B). The model provides marked evidence that the new taps 
were associated with a noticeable decrease in the incidence of P. aeruginosa 
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acquisition on ICU A (p = 1.98 x 10-5). The model suggests that the introduction of the 
new taps was associated with an immediate and sustained 72% decrease in the 
acquisition of P. aeruginosa on ICU A.  
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DISCUSSION 
P. aeruginosa can persist in hospital water systems for long periods and has resulted 
in a number of hospital outbreaks.22-23 We previously reported an outbreak of P. 
aeruginosa in an ICU setting with the source being a colonised tap outlet.2 Moreover, 
the number of tap outlets testing positive for P. aeruginosa increased from 2013 to 
2017 by 37%.17 We subsequently demonstrated that point of end filters, together with 
holistic measures, reduced the number of clinical isolates of P. aeruginosa.17 Point of 
use filters are not the ideal solution, because the filters themselves can become 
contaminated with P. aeruginosa if used inappropriately.24 Breakpoint models 
indicated the engineering and holistic interventions resulted in a 50% reduction in the 
number of P. aeruginosa clinical patient isolates over a year.17 We have continued 
our pioneering work in this area by focusing on new engineering control measures 
and the effect these have controlling the transmission of P. aeruginosa in an ICU 
setting. 
The HTM 04-01 guidance details that when an outlet is positive for P. aeruginosa, 
risk reduction and preventive measures should be considered.15 These include 
engineering considerations such as removal of flow straighteners, dismantling of tap 
outlets for cleaning and disinfection, assessing the water distribution system and 
components of the tap outlet.15 Remedial work can be difficult to undertake and there 
are no standards on the correct procedure. Indeed, we found that despite remedial 
work on tap outlets, contamination with the same strain of P. aeruginosa was seen 6 
months later.2 For this reason we were interested in a tap outlet that could withstand 
high-level disinfection. We found in a laboratory setting that a thermal washer-
disinfector cycle gave a ≥ 5 log10 reduction in CFU in three different components of 
the tap outlet, and most importantly, a tap outlet that was free from P. aeruginosa. 
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However, whilst this first phase of work gave confidence to install the new tap outles 
in a clinical area, the artificial system may not represent the formation of biofilm in 
real-life clinical settings. We found that although the test taps were clear of P. 
aeruginosa, high TVCs were detected as soon as one week after installation. This is 
not surprising, as water is known to harbour microorganisms, with biofilms 
developing quickly.25 We were then able to establish the feasibility of disinfecting 
taps in a real-life setting, and also showed that the absence of P. aeruginosa was 
sustained, aside from two episodes of low level and transient contamination  
A review by Loveday et al., (2014) indicated that there is poor evidence for 
remediation.22 However, we found that replacing half the tap outlets on an ICU area 
resulted in a significant reduction of P. aeruginosa clinical isolates based on Poisson 
regression models.  
The frequency of water testing of tap outlets for P. aeruginosa was originally 
recommended to be six-monthly.7 This recommendation has since been updated, 
and a risk assessment approach is now recommended to determine the frequency of 
water testing.15 However, there is a lack of evidence in the literature as to the 
appropriate frequency of testing. We have previously suggested that a six-monthly 
sampling regimen may result in a number of positives being missed.17 Indeed. 
Bayesian models predicted that monthly sampling would enhance the detection rate 
of P. aeruginosa in tap outlets and allow problems to be rectified more promptly.  
A Poisson regression model identified that the two most important interventions in 
reducing P. aeruginosa were the fitting of filters to selected taps across ICU, and 
alteration of the disposal of waste water and cleaning protocols. However, these 
interventions actually appeared to be associated with a slight increase in the number 
of cases of P. aeruginosa; we believe that this was coincidental rather than 
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causative. The regression model used to analyse ICU A alone, suggested the only 
important intervention was the fitting of the new taps.  
 
The introduction of the new taps was associated with an immediate and sustained 
72% decrease in the acquisition of P. aeruginosa on ICU A. If these findings were 
confirmed in larger studies they would help hospitals decide to invest in replacing 
taps as a more cost-effective alternative to fitting filters. It must be noted that QEHB 
is unique in having such a large ICU, and the impact of changing tapes may not be 
generalizable. However, we believe our results should be helpful to other hospitals 
faced with ongoing problems with P. aeruginosa contamination of tap outlets.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. Total number of ICU water outlets positive for Pseudomonas aeruginosa 
per year between 2013-2017.  
ICU 
Positive 
outlets 2013* 
Positive 
outlets 2014* 
Positive 
outlets 2015* 
Positive 
outlets 2016* 
Positive 
outlets 2017* 
Area A (20) 29% (21) 30% (28) 40% (29) 41% (20) 29% 
Area B (11) 22% (14) 29% (14) 28% (10) 20% (15) 30% 
Area C (8) 15% (13) 28% (15) 30% (12) 24% (9) 18% 
Area D (7) 10% (14) 23% (17) 28% (22) 36% (19) 31% 
Total (46) 20% (59) 26% (54) 24% (73) 31% (63) 27% 
Key: *Numbers in the brackets refer to number of positive outlets 
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Table 2. The predicted probabilities of (at least one) positive tap outlet over a six-
month period from the different sites, depending upon whether sampling is 
undertaken monthly or six-monthly. 
Site Tap type 
Probability of Positive Isolate 
Monthly sample 6-Monthly 
sample 
A2 Lobby Control 0.386 0.083 
A4 Control 1.000 0.917 
A7 Control 0.639 0.167 
A10 Control 1.000 0.944 
A20 Control 1.000 0.889 
A22 Control 0.386 0.083 
A25 Control 0.916 0.361 
Blood Gas Control 0.639 0.167 
A11 Lobby Test 0.146 0.028 
A12 Test 0.146 0.028 
A13 Test 0.274 0.056 
A14 Test 0.146 0.028 
A15 Test 0.146 0.028 
A16 Test 0.146 0.028 
A17 Test 0.274 0.056 
Blood Gas Test 0.146 0.028 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Marwik 21, Armitage Shanks tap outlet installed onto ICU A. 
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Figure 2. Timeline of interventions during the study. 
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Figure 3A. Rate of P. aeruginosa clinical isolates per 100,000 bed days in the entire 
critical care. 
 
Key: The dotted lines represent the infection prevention and control interventions, 
which had a significant impact upon the segmented Poisson regression models. The 
blue lines represent the mean values predicted by the Poisson regression model. 
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Figure 3B. Rate of Pseudomonas aeruginosa clinical isolates per 100,000 bed days 
in the critical care unit A. 
 
Key: The dotted line represents the infection prevention and control intervention, 
which had a significant impact upon the segmented Poisson regression models. The 
blue lines represent the mean values predicted by the Poisson regression model. 
 
